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The Award in the Matter of the South China Sea issued by an arbitral tribunal in July 2016 is a major
contribution to the jurisprudence on the law of the sea, the rules of marine environmental protection and
various other aspects of general international law and dispute settlement. It is, of course, beyond this case
note to answer whether the Award will ultimately contribute to the peaceful resolution of one of the most
intractable and contentious international situations. Nevertheless, as an Award given under a treaty – the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – that is binding on both States as
parties thereto, ‘[i]t goes without saying that both Parties are obliged to resolve their dispute peacefully and
to comply with the Convention and this Award in good faith’.1
Within the scope of a case note it is not possible to detail the geo-politics of the dispute or to reflect on its
future significance. In fact, as it runs to over 475 pages, it is difficult to do little more than outline some of
the legal issues arising from the Award. Nevertheless, despite its length and complexity, the Award
represents at its heart a classical reassertion of the necessary balancing of rights and obligations that
UNCLOS has always sought to achieve. As the preamble to the Convention very famously had cause to
note: ‘the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all
States, a legal order for the seas’.
The case note is divided into three parts; Part 1 will provide an overview of the dispute and a history of
the proceedings and Part 2 will provide a summary of some of the key findings – and underlying reasoning –
tomany of the most contentious issues onmaritime entitlement. Part 3 will then focus on those aspects of the
1. Award of 12 July 2016, para 1200.
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Award more specifically related to environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources. The
case note will conclude by suggesting that notwithstanding the low probability of China’s formal compli-
ance with the Award, the reasoning in this Award will be influential both as a matter of general international
law but it will also likely reframe the South China Sea dispute whether its leading protagonist wishes it to or
not.
Part 1: History of the Dispute
The present legal proceedings began with the submission by the Philippines of a unilateral application under
UNCLOS rules on dispute resolution on 22 January 2013. One of the singular strengths of UNCLOS is the
inclusion of a compulsory dispute settlement process – admittedly with various exceptions and caveats –
which allows one side of a dispute to initiate proceedings before a range of dispute settlement institutions.
As with many of the disputes where there is no prior consensus on dispute settlement, it is heard before an
arbitral tribunal under AnnexVII UNCLOS. China rejected the Philippines right to bring the arbitration, and
has not participated in the proceedings at any point. Nevertheless, as Article 9 of Annex VII UNCLOS
expressly states: ‘[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the
proceedings’. The arbitral tribunal has thus had to take special measures to ensure that China’s interests are
fully respected within the procedure and its likely arguments considered in its deliberations. Whilst not
participating in the proceedings, China has issued various Notes Verbales and made other statements which
have given the arbitration tribunal some understanding of the Chinese position.
Of key importance has been the scope of the legal dispute. The international situation in the South China
Sea is a complex interplay of land and maritime disputes, involving not only the Philippines and China but
also many of the other regional States, including Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei, as well as other maritime
powers, including, notably, the United States. Many of the disputes revolve around questions of sovereignty
of land but, as a treaty on maritime affairs, UNCLOS does not address territorial sovereignty, nor can its
dispute resolution procedures resolve maritime disputes that implicitly require the underlying territorial
sovereignty also to be adjudged. As a general principle of international law, ‘the land dominates the sea’ and
thus a State’s sovereignty over maritime areas flows from its sovereignty of its land territory. To avoid this
insurmountable jurisdictional issue, the Philippines’ claims were narrowly constructed to avoid questions of
territorial sovereignty, or in any way requiring the Tribunal to delimit maritime boundaries (which would
invariably require agreement or a judgment on the sovereignty over particular territory). Rather, the
Philippines’ claims revolved around three broad areas:
1. that all maritime entitlements in the South China Sea are to be determined in accordance with the
rules of UNCLOS, and that in particular the Chinese claim to expansive historic rights under its
‘Nine-Dash line’ marked out on Chinese maps is contrary to UNCLOS;
2. that various maritime features claimed by both sides are either low-tide elevations (which exist
above the surface at low-tide but are submerged at high-tide), and which according to international
law do not generate their own maritime zones, or that they are rocks (in contrast to being classed as
islands) and thus do not generate substantial maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles; and
3. various disputes concerning Chinese activities in the South China Sea, such as the construction of
artificial islands and land reclamation (which, in many cases, was allegedly causing severe
environmental harm), infringement of the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive
economic zone, allowing its fishermen to harvest endangered species and to use harmful fishing
methods, and incidences of near-miss collisions.
The Philippines also sought for the Tribunal to find that China had aggravated the dispute during the
course of the arbitration through various artificial construction and land reclamation activities, as well as
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restricting movement of the Philippines military in a particular area.2 In all, the Philippines brought forward
15 claims (‘Submissions’) against China.
In an initial Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility issued on 29 October 2015, the Tribunal found that
China’s absence was not a bar to the proceedings, that the Philippines had not abused the process by
initiating the arbitration (as China had alleged), and that the Philippines had not agreed to another dispute
resolution procedure for the South China Sea dispute that would exclude arbitration under UNCLOS. As
regards the claims themselves, the Tribunal found that it had clear jurisdiction over seven of the claims, that
it might have jurisdiction over seven of the other claims subject to what was decided on the merits and, as
regards one claim, the Tribunal sought further clarification as to its scope. Significantly, the Tribunal noted
that it ‘does not see that any of the Philippines’ Submissions require an implicit determination of sover-
eignty . . .The Tribunal . . . intends to ensure that its decision neither advances nor detracts from either
Party’s claims to land sovereignty in the South China Sea’.3
Part 2: Award on Merits: General Issues
As previously noted, the Tribunal, in reaching its findings in the Award of 12 July 2016, had to do so without
the participation of Chinese counsel and what undoubtedly would have been the submission of detailed
Chinese arguments, both on the law and on many technical aspects. In part to compensate for this, the
Tribunal appointed various experts to advise on particular issues, notably navigational safety and coral
reefs. Moreover, though it did not participate, China did take the opportunity to make numerous statements
on the arbitration process as well as to write to the individual arbitrators on various matters. Excerpts of each
of these are all included in the Tribunal’s Award. The Tribunal also made significant use of material in the
public domain, seeking views from both parties on such sources, which China neither directly commented
on, nor replied to. As a matter of process, the Tribunal was thus seeking to ensure procedural fairness, as
well as recognising that, as a matter of law, it was not permitted simply to accept the Philippines’ arguments
but must satisfy itself ‘not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well founded
in fact and law’.4
In what will be perhaps the most contentious finding for China, the Tribunal ruled against the legality of
the ‘Nine-Dash line’, the Chinese claim to historic rights in the South China Sea. The finding of the Tribunal
is extensively reasoned but at its simplest it is premised on two key findings. First, that ‘[t]he Convention
thus provides – and defines limits within – a comprehensive system of maritime zones that is capable of
encompassing any area of sea or seabed’.5 Secondly, that ‘upon China’s accession to the Convention . . . any
historic rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’
were superseded . . . by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention’.6 Indeed, the
Tribunal goes on to note that such a finding ‘should not be considered exceptional or unexpected’.7
The Tribunal is very careful, however, to place this hugely symbolic loss to China within the context of
what it has gained by joining UNCLOS. As a useful summary of the balancing of rights and responsibilities
which all States parties are required to respect, it is worth quoting in full:
2. As regards those claims relating to disputes concerning military activities, the Tribunal ruled that it did not possess jurisdiction by
virtue of the exception declared by China as permitted under Art. 298(1)(b) UNCLOS.
3. Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015, para. 153.
4. Article 9, Annex VII UNCLOS. Emphasis added.
5. Award of 12 July 2016, para. 231.
6. Ibid, para. 262.
7. Ibid.
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China’s ratification of the Convention . . . did not extinguish historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea.
Rather, China relinquished the freedoms of the high seas that it had previously utilised with respect to the living
and non-living resources of certain sea areas which the international community had collectively determined to
place within the ambit of the exclusive economic zone of other States. At the same time, China gained a greater
degree of control over the maritime zones adjacent to and projecting from its coasts and islands. China’s freedom
to navigate the South China Sea remains unaffected.8
In addition to ruling on the Nine-Dash line, the Tribunal was called on to characterise several maritime
features, the effect of such characterisation being then to determine the extent of its maritime entitlement. In
short, low-tide elevations – a maritime feature not visible at high tide – creates no entitlement to a maritime
zone, though it may be used to determine the baseline fromwhich such zones are measured. However, rocks
– a maritime feature visible at high tide – do create an entitlement to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles,
though only an island (Article 121(3) UNCLOS) generates an entitlement to a 200 nautical miles continent
shelf and an exclusive economic zone. Thus, this arbitration required the Tribunal to differentiate between
different maritime features, especially between a rock and an island, the latter needing to be able to show
that it has the capacity to ‘sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own’. These are distinctly legal
questions, but equally they are open to factual interpretation and the existence and availability of appro-
priate evidence, including photographic and satellite imagery.
Before briefly outlining the Tribunal’s findings, three comments are worth mentioning. First, human
modification of low-tide elevations – through reclamation or artificial construction – will not change the
original nature of the feature. As the Tribunal notes, ‘[a]s a matter of law, human modification cannot
change the seabed into a low-tide elevation or a low-tide elevation into an island’.9 Rather, ‘the Convention
requires that the status of a feature be ascertained on the basis of its earlier, natural condition, prior to the
onset of significant human modification’.10
Secondly, to determine whether something is a low-tide elevation or a high-tide rock required the
Tribunal to determine ‘high tide’; the vertical datum. As the Tribunal notes, high tide is subject to various
possible interpretations, including ‘mean high water’, ‘mean higher high water’ and ‘mean high water
springs’. It is further complicated by the fact that the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, which affects
regional tidal patterns. The essentially scientific issue of determining the tidal range thus posed an important
issue for the Tribunal as the legal implications were significant. The Tribunal relied heavily on historical
observations by, inter alia, the British Royal Navy and the Japanese Navy, as well as information contained
inmodern Chinese charts. The Tribunal was less convinced by the evidence submitted by the Philippines via
remote sensing through satellite imagery. Recognising its probative value in certain circumstances, the
Tribunal queries how far conclusions can be drawn from such images, especially as ‘the time of image
capture will generally not align with either high or low tide’.11
A third issue – of direct relevance here, but undoubtedly of general importance in the longer-term
interpretation of the Convention – is when does a rock meet the criteria to become an island? As noted
above, Article 121(3) sets out conditions of human habitation or economic life; indeed the Tribunal spends
five paragraphs discussing the ‘or’ between these terms, concluding in fact that, in most instances, ‘humans
will rarely inhabit areas where no economic activity or livelihood is possible’.12 The Tribunal looks deeply
8. Ibid, para. 271.
9. Ibid, para. 305.
10. Ibid, para. 306.
11. Ibid, para. 323.
12. Ibid, para. 497. The Tribunal does acknowledge, however, that there may be instances ‘where multiple islands are used in concert
to sustain a traditional way of life’.
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into the object and purpose of the Convention, the literal meaning of the words and the travaux pre´par-
atoires of the negotiations to ascertain its true meaning. It makes a number of important statements. First,
similarly to the assessment of low-tide elevations, its status is to be determined ‘on the basis of its natural
capacity, without external additions or modifications’.13 Secondly, the key factor to determine whether
there is human habitation is ‘the non-transient character of the inhabitation’, namely ‘the inhabitation of the
feature by a stable community of people for whom the feature constitutes a home and on which they can
remain’.14 Thirdly, for a feature to have an ‘economic life of its own’ it must be capable of sustaining the
economic life of the inhabitants; the Tribunal views this as not being met either when ‘[e]conomic
activity . . . is entirely dependent on external resources’ (including placing reliance on the maritime
resources of its surrounding waters or seabed) or when it is ‘devoted to using a feature as an object for
extractive activities without the involvement of a local population’.15
As interesting as these findings are, it is their application to the facts of this dispute, which is likely to be
particularly contentious. The Tribunal examines in great detail the application of the criteria to the rocks and
elevations in the Spratly Islands that are abovewater at high-tide. Examining the presence of potablewater, and
studies on vegetation and agricultural productivity, as well as historical accounts of their use by fishermen, the
Tribunal concludes that none of the rocks meet the criteria to be an island laid out in the Convention. The
dismissal of the presence of sufficiently sustainable groups of fishermen is likely to prove especially contro-
versial with China, especially as the Tribunal itself recognises that some of these men were present ‘for
comparatively long periods of time’. 16 Nevertheless, this is as much about policy as it is the historical record,
with the Tribunal noting that it was not the purpose of the Convention to generate expansive maritime
entitlements for features ‘whose historical contribution to human settlement is as slight as that’.17 Is this
judicial interpretation of open-textured provisions or extra-judicial decision-making? Either way, this Award
will provide the new international standard for what is an island for the purposes of the law of the sea.
On the basis of these and other findings, the Tribunal was able to identify those features which were low-
tide elevations and those which were rocks and ruled against any being islands. For the most part, these
rulings were to the benefit of the Philippines’ claims. More importantly, for the Philippines, by not finding
any feature to be an island, the result was that two of the most contested features –Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal (which the Tribunal had found to be low-tide elevations) – are thus located with the
established exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and as it is not within 200 nautical miles of any
feature to which China could possibly claim sovereignty, these key features remain part of the maritime
entitlement of the Philippines. It is worthwhile pausing here to reflect what the Tribunal has done. It has not
ruled on sovereignty but, in effect, it has. By finding that something is a low-tide elevation (the first-order
question), incapable of being possessed by means of territoriality, the Tribunal has in essence ruled out the
question of sovereignty (a second-order question). As a matter of formal law, it ensures a coherent and
internally logical Award, but one might wonder how far this legal deduction will be persuasive within
internal Chinese political deliberations or in international negotiations?
Part 3: Award on Merits: Specific Findings on Marine Environmental Harm
If much of the popular attention surrounding the Award is on the dismissal of the Nine-Dash line, this would
fail to capture the Philippines’ multiple claims around environmental harm, the utilisation of natural
13. Ibid, para. 541.
14. Ibid, para. 542.
15. Ibid, para. 543.
16. Ibid, para. 601.
17. Ibid, para. 621.
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resources, and the failure of China to regulate appropriately its fishing fleet and related complaints. In fact,
the complaints upheld are sufficiently numerous that it is useful to provide them in summary form:
1. China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights over non-living resources in its continental shelf by
interfering in lawful surveying activity by the Philippines.
2. China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights over living resources in its exclusive economic zone
by issuing a moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea, without exception to either Philippines’
maritime zones or whether it applied to domestic or foreign fishing fleet.
3. China violated Philippines’ sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone by failing to exercise
due diligence in preventing fishing by Chinese-registered vessels.
4. Notwithstanding the unresolved issue of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, China acted unlaw-
fully by preventing traditional fishing by Filipino fishermen.18
5. China violated UNCLOS provisions on protecting the marine environment by failing to act with due
diligence in preventing Chinese-registered vessels from undertaking harmful fishing practices and
harvesting endangered species, in particular the harvesting of sea turtles, giant clams and the damage
done to coral reefs.
6. China violated various UNCLOS provisions on protecting the marine environment by undertaking
land reclamation activities and constructing artificial islands causing severe harm to coral reefs.
7. China aggravated the dispute during the course of the arbitration by continuing to undertake con-
struction works on various reefs, inflicting severe and irreparable harm on the natural coral, as well
as destroying evidence of the natural condition of such reefs.
These proven claims were not the only submissions made. For instance, it was claimed that China
permitted its fishermen to use explosives and cyanide as fishing techniques. The Tribunal considered the
submissions but found it had insufficient evidence on which to rule.19 Nevertheless, it is clear from the
extent of the rulings against China that the South China Sea is facing substantial, sustained and, in some
cases, severe environmental damage. As the Award states, in relation to the artificial construction activities,
‘[t]he conclusions of the Tribunal-appointed independent experts are unequivocal with respect to the more
recent construction activities, which they say have ‘‘impacted reefs on a scale unprecedented in the
region’’.’20
It is not possible within the scope of this case note to provide a detailed analysis of the application of the
relevant marine environmental provisions of UNCLOS. Nevertheless, a few key points can be made. First,
the recognition at numerous points that China is not only responsible for its own activities which violate
UNCLOS, but also for those of its nationals where harm also occurs is significant. This latter responsibility
is, however, not an absolute one but is an obligation of conduct, framed in terms of due diligence. This is
discussed at several points in the Award, notably in relation to its failure to prevent Chinese fishing in the
Philippine exclusive economic zone (item (c) above) and failing to prevent harmful fishing practices and
damage to sensitive ecosystems (item (e) above).
As regards the former, the Tribunal admits that exercising due diligence over fishermen acting unlaw-
fully cannot always be easily determined: ‘[o]ften unlawful fishing will be carried out covertly, far from any
18. The discussion of traditional, or artisanal, fishing is particularly interesting (see paras 794–804). The Tribunal is careful to note
how traditional fishing is preserved (and thus can be distinguished from a State’s historic rights, which have been extinguished);
‘[t]hese are not the historic rights of States . . . but private rights [unconnected to] ‘‘the western legal fiction . . .whereby all legal
rights, even those in reality held by individuals, were deemed to be those of the State’’‘ (para. 798, quotingEritrea v Yemen, Award
of 17 December 1999, para. 101).
19. Ibid, para. 975.
20. Ibid, para. 978.
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official presence, and it will be far from obvious what the flag State could realistically have done to prevent
it’.21 However, in this instance, the Tribunal not only finds an absence of due diligence but also something
close to collusion between fishermen and the State; the evidence ‘support[s] an inference that China’s
fishing vessels are not simply escorted and protected, but organised and coordinated by the Government’.22
A secondary aspect of due diligence is evidenced later in the Award where the Tribunal is discussing the
obligations expected of States to prevent ships flying their flag from breaching the environmental provi-
sions, in this case Articles 192 (the general obligation: ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment’) and 194 (measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution). As the Tribunal notes,
relying on jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,23 the Seabed Disputes
Chamber24 and the International Court of Justice,25 such obligations require due diligence ‘in the sense of a
flag State not only adopting appropriate rules and measures, but also ‘a certain level of vigilance in their
enforcement and the exercise of administrative control’.26 On the facts before it, the Tribunal notes that
while measures and rules may have been adopted to prevent harmful fishing practices – namely a 1989
Chinese wildlife law which prohibits, inter alia, the catching of sea turtles and giant clams – ‘[t]here is no
evidence . . . that would indicate that China has taken any steps to enforce those rules’.27 This is to be
contrasted with the position that the Tribunal takes on the allegation of use of cyanide and explosives, where
it indicates that there is no evidence that China has failed to enforce its own rules in this regard.28
As regards the construction of artificial islands over low-tide elevations and reefs – activities undertaken
by China itself – the obligation is not one of due diligence, but rather can be directly imputed to it. Based on
the evidence provided and the report of experts, the Tribunal makes some of its strongest pronouncements in
relation to this submission. Finding that the artificial island-building has ‘caused devastating and long-
lasting damage to the marine environment’, the Tribunal finds a violation of Article 192 (the general
obligation), that dredging has caused marine pollution contrary to Article 194(1), and that it has failed to
protect rare or fragile ecosystems contrary to Article 194(5). In addition, the Tribunal finds that China has
failed to cooperate with neighbouring States under Article 197 and, as the South China Sea is a semi-
enclosed sea, also violated the obligations under Article 123 of UNCLOS.
Importantly, the Tribunal also found that China had failed to follow the appropriate procedure necessary
to undertake an impact assessment under Article 206.29 This obligation requires a State to undertake and
communicate such an assessment where they have ‘reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities
under their jurisdiction or control may cause significant and harmful changes to the marine environment’.
Unable to finally determine whether such an impact assessment had, in fact, been undertaken, the Tribunal
noted that a key feature of Article 206 was nevertheless its requirement that a State communicate such an
assessment, which it was apparent to the Tribunal had not occurred either bilaterally to the Philippines or
to competent multilateral organisations. Building on the recent judgment of the International Court in
Construction of a Road (Nicaragua v Costa Rica),30 the Tribunal noted that it was necessary for a State
21. Ibid, para. 754.
22. Ibid, para. 755.
23. Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion of 2 April
2015.
24. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory
Opinion of 1 February 2011.
25. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), ICJ Reports (2010) 4.
26. Award of 12 July 2016, para. 944, quoting Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, para. 197.
27. Ibid, para. 964.
28. Ibid, para. 974.
29. Ibid, para. 989.
30. See ICJ Reports (2015) para. 154.
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to do more than merely assert that such an assessment existed; rather it had to prove its existence. Moreover,
in something akin to judicial renvoi, the Tribunal relies on China’s own environmental impact assessment
law to identify how China had failed to comply with its own domestic requirements.31
Finally, it should be noted that the Tribunal found against China (item (7) above) by noting how China
had undertaken various environmentally damaging activities during the period that the arbitration had been
ongoing, thus aggravating the dispute still further. In some cases irreparable damage had now occurred to
several of the maritime features. Indeed, at Mischief Reef – perhaps aptly named – ‘China has effectively
created a fait accompli . . . by constructing a large artificial island . . . In practical terms, the implementation
of the Tribunal’s decision will be significantly more difficult for the Parties, and Mischief Reef cannot be
returned to its original state’.32
Notwithstanding evidence of such blatant aggravation, the Tribunal reverted to a more traditional stance
when faced by a request by the Philippines to adopt a prospective declaration as to China’s future conduct.
The Tribunal refuses to issue such a declaration believing that the Award itself provides clarity as to each
State’s respective rights and responsibilities. In what is perhaps an inevitable, but undue, deference to the
belief in the authority of international law, the Tribunal suggests that bad faith is not to be presumed and that
as ‘[n]either Party contests’ that they are not bound by the Convention ‘including its provisions regards the
resolution of disputes’33 a more proactive declaration is unnecessary. The evidence presented previously as
to ongoing aggravation of the dispute might have suggested differently.
Conclusion
The Tribunal’s Award is significant in a number of respects, which have been outlined above. Nevertheless,
this is a complex and rich Award deserving of further scrutiny. At best, it is a classical reassertion of the
constitutional status of UNCLOS as governing each States Parties’ rights and responsibilities under the
international law of the sea. As noted above, the Award is particularly strong on holding States to account
for environmental damage, in a way that few law of the sea cases have yet done. On this basis, one hopes that
it will set a benchmark for other tribunals to follow. However, there is weakness here. In terms of political
reality, China is likely to pay scant regard to the Award, and has already dismissed it.34 Nevertheless, even
without formal compliance, there is no doubt that it will change the tone of the wider debate. Such Awards,
once made, cannot be undone, and it will create the framework for future debates and dialogues, even if
some of its rulings are politically difficult or – in light of island-building – impossible now to comply with.
Finally, one further thought. Unbeknownst to the Tribunal, this Award is likely to have an effect –
incidentally and potentially negatively – on a very different environmental subject, namely climate change
and sea-level rise. The way in which the Tribunal reasoned against land reclamation and artificial island
building, determining the status of a maritime feature exclusively on the basis of its natural state, or that
rocks cannot be improved externally to convert them into islands – all rational from the perspective of State-
building in the South China Sea – may need to be re-addressed in the future in the very different context of
climate change. To the extent that UNCLOS provides a legal framework for one of the most intractable
political disputes, this surely gives some hope that it might also provide a basis to answer other challenges
erga omnes facing the wider international community.
31. Award of 12 July 2016, para. 990.
32. Ibid, para. 1177.
33. Ibid, para. 1201.
34. Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in South China Sea case’. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-
wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china (last accessed 12 July 2016).
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